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Vl 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(h) grants the Utah Court of Appeals 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by Appellee are more properly stated as follows: 
1. Reservation of Retroactive Child Support. 
A. Issue Presented: Where Appellant Ms. Feldman's petition sought child 
support retroactive to March 2009, and she never raised the issue of child support 
further back than that in any pleading, did the trial court en- in denying a motion to 
amend to seek suppmi back to 2005, when the motion was first made on the 
morning of trial and then made again after trial under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b), where 
the trial court found that there was no implied consent and such an amendment 
would prejudice the Appellee? 
B. Standard of Review: The standard of review for application of Rule 
15(b) is a little complicated, as it can be reviewed in several parts: 
The trial court's conclusion as to whether the paiiies tiied an issue by express 
or implied consent is reviewed for correctness. However, the trial court is granted 
"a fairly broad measure of discretion in making that detennination." 
Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, ,r 19, 166 P.3d 639, 646 (citing Fibro 
Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, ,r 8, 974 P.2d 288). 
"Where the parties did not hy the issues by express or implied consent the 
trial court's discretion to grant amendment of the pleadings is conditioned on the 
satisfaction of two preliminary requirements: 
[ 1] a finding that the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved by amendment and 
[2] a finding that the admission of such evidence wouid not prejudice the 
adverse party. The trial comi has only limited discretion in making these 
preliminary findings." 
Id. (citing Fibro Trust at ,r 9, with all internal edits omitted). 
"Finally, if the parties did not try the issues by express or implied consent 
but the two preliminary requirements have been met, "the trial court has full 
discretion to allow amendment of the pleadings; that is, it may grant or deny a 
party's motion for amendment upon any reasonable basis, and the court's decision 
can be reversed only if abuse of discretion appears." Id. (quoting Fibro Trust at 
if9). 
2. Waiver of Retroactive Child Support. 
A. Issue Presented: Where the trial comi expressly stated that it did not 
make its decision based on waiver, was the trial court required by Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-12-109, to allow Appellant to amend her complaint on the morning of trial to 
2 
seek child suppmi back to 2005, when the only pleading ever filed requested 
support only back to March 2009, and the trial court found such amendment would 
prejudice Appellee? 
B. Standard of Review: This presents a question regarding the interpretation 
of the cited statute and Utah R. Civ. P. 15, which is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court. E.g. Vorher v. 
Henriod, 2013 UT 10, if6, 297 P.3d 614. 
3. Imputation of Income. 
A. Issue Presented: Whether the trial court had to find Mr. Argenziano was 
voluntaiily underemployed before it could "impute" income to Mr. Argenziano to 
detennine child supp01i. 
B. Standard of Review: This presents a question of statutory interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. §78B-12-203(7), which is reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference to the trial comi. E.g. Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10, if6, 297 P.3d 
614. 
C. Issue Presented: Did the evidence support the trial comi's decision 
declining to find Mr. Argenziano voluntarily underemployed for child support 
purposes, where the court took evidence on the issue, entered findings of fact, and 
the proponent of the proposition (that he was voluntarily underemployed) adduced 
no evidence to support her contention that Mr. Argenziano was voluntarily 
underemployed.? 
D. Standard of Review: "[Appellate courts] will review the trial court's 
decisions regarding child support and alimony under the abuse of discretion 
" ~a•1rl,-.,,-rl" A,,, d•~1•n , , ,1 ,,, ,,1,,. , .... 2orn UT A"'"' 201 CT O 1 ?;0 p 1rl 7,.1. 7,7 
.::,l 1 ua1Lt. n ti tft,·i.u v . .n.. 1u.,.1,r vr.u, v1 .1. -i...1-'l:-' / .1.., II_,, .1.v _, .J... ·-''-'- , ...., , , , ...., • 
Additionally, because Appellant, Ms. Feldman contends the clear weight of 
the evidence weighed against finding that Mr. Argenziano was not voluntarily 
underemployed, she attacks the court ' s finding of fact. "To establish that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding, ' [a]n appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in suppmi as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence. " ' Tay lor v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 331, ,r 8,263 P.3d 
1200, 1202 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 7f 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (alteration 
in original)). 
E. Issue Presented: Did the evidence support the trial court's finding of Mr. 
Argenziano ' s income for child suppmi purposes, when the court used a variety of 
factors, including statutory factors for imputing income, but where it expressly 
clarified: (1) that it did not find Mr. Argenziano to be underemployed, and (2) that 
it did not just impute income. 
4 
F. Standard of Review: "[Appellate comis] will review the trial com1's 
decisions regarding child support and alimony under the abuse of discretion 
standard." Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, i-f 9, 169 P.3d 754, 757. "A trial 
comi's decision regarding child support will not be disturbed absent "manifest 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of ... discretion." Jensen v. 
Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 
736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.) cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)). 
Additionally, because Appellant, Ms. Feldman contends the clear weight of 
the evidence weighed the trial comi's finding of Mr. Argenziano's income, she 
attacks the court's finding of fact. "To establish that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the court's finding, ' [ a ]n appellant must marshal the evidence in suppmi of 
the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in supp01i as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence."' Taylor v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 331, i-f 8,263 P.3d 1200, 1202 
(quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, i-f 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (alteration in 
original)). 
4. Contempt 
A. Issue Presented: As stated by Appellant, Ms. Feldman: Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in declining to hold Mr. Argenziano in contempt for 
5 
having failed to pay child support in accordance with the trial court's temporary 
order prior to trial. 
B. Standard of Review: A decision to not hold a party in contempt is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ,r 14, 
294 P.3d 600. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's Brief correctiy states the nature of the case and the decision 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts contains some argumentative portions or spin, 
which this Court can sift, 1 but the following is a more succinct guide for this 
Comi's decision in this matter: 
lv1s. Feldman's Complaint, filed in September 2009, requested child support 
be awarded beginning effective March 2009.2 Her Complaint also alleged, and Mr. 
1The very first line of Ms . Feldman's Brief mischaracterizes the trial court's 
decision as a "decision to deny four years of child support to A.E.R., the minor 
child .. " Appellant's Br. p. 8. That was not the court's ruling. The trial court 
denied Ms. Feldman's motion to amend her complaint, which was not made until 
the morning of trial. R. 2146-7. 
2The Complaint was originally filed by ORS, but Ms. Feldman was added in 
and effectively substituted as the plaintiff in October 2010. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("FOFCL"), p.2, R. 2213. Ms. Reller petitioned to be a 
6 
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Argenziano admitted that, "issues regarding reimbursement of support . . . should 
be reserved for separate determination upon application to the comi by either the 
alleged father or mother." Complaint iT 19, R. 4 ( emphasis added); Answer iT 19, R. 
24. The posh1re of the pleadings then was that retroactivity back to 2005 was not 
to be a trial issue in this case. 
Subsequently, the parties attempted to resolve matters by a stipulation, which 
was filed September 16, 2010. R. 362 - 72. In that stipulation, Ms. Feldman and 
Mr. Argenziano agreed that prospective suppmt would cormnence September 1, 
20 IO and that there would be "retroactive child supp01t from July 1, 2009 to 
August 1,201 O" in the amount of $26,000. R. 364 -65. The trial court declined to 
approve that stipulation, inter alia, because it was only a paiiial settlement. R . 373. 
But as of September 2010, and at all times thereafter - until the morning of trial -
there were only two dates appearing in the record that dealt with the date to which 
claims for retroactive child support could apply. That was the March 2009 date in 
the Complaint, and the July 1, 2009 date set forth in the Stipulation. 
"copetitioner" and was added as such by Order. R. 389. Later ORS withdrew, 
leaving Ms. Feldman as the sole plaintiff, at which time the trial court ordered that 
"[t]he underlying complaint remains." R. 433 . 
7 
Ms. Feldman then brought her Motion For Temporary Orders And to 
Enforce The Settlement Agreement. There she asked that Mr. Argenziano "be 
ordered to immediately pay $2,000 in monthly child support in accordance with the 
parties' stipulation and agreement." R. 3 99. Regarding retroactive suppmi, she 
asked that he be ordered to pay "back child support pursuant to the parties' 
stipulated agreement in an amount not less than $28,000.00 for unpaid child 
support. ;' Id. In other words, she sought the i3 months "retroactive" suppo11 back 
to July 1, 2009. The trial comi declined to enforce the Stipulation, but did award 
child support prospectively from November 2010 . Minute Entry January 13, 2011, 
R. 482. The trial comi's minute entry noted that it was with "prior claims reserved 
for trial." R. 482. As of that time, no claim for support retroactive to 2005 had 
been made. The only claims for retroactive child suppo1i were the one in the 
Complaint (to March 2009) and the one in !v1s. Feldman's lvfotion for Temporary 
Orders (July 2009). The resulting Order stated "the issue of whether or not the 
Respondent should be ordered to pay to Petitioner support prior to November 2010 
is reserved for trial." R. 539. 
The claims before the court never changed. Later, Mr. Argenziano suffered 
significant declines in income and moved the trial comi to reduce the temporary 
support obligation. R. R. 646 - 720. Ms. Feldman replied to that motion for 
8 
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reduction, but never alluded to any intention of seeking suppo1i back to 2005 . R. 
724 -26. On November 7, 2011, the trial comi entered its Order on Respondent's 
Counter-Motion to Reduce Tempora1y Child Suppmi, in which it stated that the 
"other provisions contained in the Order on Review Hearing of January 13, 2011 
shall remain in full force and effect." But again, as ofNovember 7, 2011, no claim 
had been made regarding support back to 2005. 
Discovery closed on March 21, 2013 and five months later the paiiies filed 
their trial Briefs on the same day, August 21, 2013. Ms. Feldman's trial Brief was 
the first court filing indicating that she now intended to seek child suppo1i as far 
back as 2005. A pretrial conference was held on August 28, 2013. At that time, 
Argenziano's counsel tried to raise the issue of exhibits that went back further than 
2009. However, Feldman's counsel interrupted and spoke over him. Additionally 
Feldman's counsel agreed that fon11al written objections need not be made, and all 
objections to exhibits would be raised at trial. R. 2573, Pretrial Conf. Tr. 6:20-21; 
8:9-24 (Addendum C); R. 2527, Declaration of James A. McIntyre. 
Trial was held on October 2, 2013, just a little more than a month after the 
pretrial conference. As was agreed could happen, Mr. Argenziano objected to 
some evidence Ms. Feldman proposed to introduce, including evidence regarding 
awarding child support retroactively before March 2009. Ms. Feldman then orally 
9 
moved to amend her Complaint to seek support retroactive to 2005 . The trial court 
took the matter under advisement, instructing the parties to Brief the issue of 
whether amendment could be allowed. However, the trial court did allow the 
presentation of such evidence, subject to a ruling on whether, ultimately, it could 
he ~rlmitt2rl. 
The parties briefed the issue and, thereafter, the trial court ruled that the oral 
motion to amend, made the morning of trial, could not be granted. Inter alia, Ivis. 
Feldman did not establish justification for her delay and, of more importance here, 
Mr. Argenziano would be prejudiced by allowing such an amendment. The trial 
court then issued its Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law ("FOFCL"). 
Among other things, the trial court found the following: 
"In 2008 the economy went into recession .... and this had a significant 
the fact than I-IC Wainwright reneged on hiring him impacted Mr. Argenziano's 
income. In 2009, he then went to work for NewBridge Securities where he had 
good year. However, he was then "forced to look for new employment .. . and 
terminated his employinent with Newbridge Securities in June 2011." Id. In July 
2011, Mr. Argenziano went to work for Rockwell with a salary. However, he had 
10 
had no income for eight months. A year later, July 1, 2012, his position at 
Rockwell was terminated and he no longer got a salary.3 R.2216, FOFCL. 
Mr. Argenziano has worked for "boutique Brokerage firms, often as an 
independent contractor without any pay." R. 2127 FOFCL. He does not have 
employment opportunities with larger brokerages. 
After the trial, Ms. Feldman filed her Rule 59(a) and (b) Motion for a New 
Trial. R. 2474- 2500. Her Motion For New Trial raised many of the same issues 
and arguments now before this Comi. Those included her contentions that the t1ial 
court should have allowed amendment of the pleadings under Utah R. Civ. P.l 5(b ), 
and that its failure to do so resulted in an improper waiver, and that the trial comi's 
analysis regarding voluntary underemployment and imputation of income was 
against the weight of the evidence. Id. 
The trial comi denied her Motion For New Trial in its Memorandum 
Decision of July 2, 2014. R. 2556-2562. The Memorandum Decision aiiiculated 
its bases for the denial of the Motion For New Trial, as well as some of the logic 
and bases behind the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 
2556-2562. The trial court expressly clarified that it did not find Mr. Argenziano 
3The finding states "2013 '1 which is a typographical error. Mr. Argenziano 
then went on commission with Rockwell, but left in November 2102 "because on 
non-payment." R. 2216, FOFCL ,r22. 
11 
to be voluntarily underemployed. It also clarified that it did not impute income, but 
rather used the word "impute" perhaps incorrectly. The trial court's Memorandum 
Decision makes it abundantly clear that (1) Ms. Feldman offered little or no 
evidence and did not meet her burden of establishing that Mr. Argenziano was 
voluntarily underemployed; (2) the trial court looked at a variety of factors in 
determining whether a voluntary underemployment situation existed; and (3) the 
trial court looked at many factors in determining an appropriate income for 
purposes of prospective child supp01i. In the end, the trial court arrived at a 
monthly income figure that was a little higher than Mr. Argenziano's actual current 
income. With respect to its decision denying Ms. Feldman's Rule 15(b) and waiver 
argument, the trial court reiterated that it did not decide based on a waiver 
argument, but "merely that she had failed to comply with URCP 15." R. 2559. 
predating 2009 and he would be prejudiced by a last-minute amendment of the 
Complaint. R.2559-2560. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A main element of Ms. Feldman 's appeal is that the trial comi e1Ted in not 
allowing her last-minute amendment of the pleadings to seek child supp01i 
retroactive to 2005, rather than March of 2009 - the date that she had pleaded. 
12 
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Applying Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), the trial comi determined that Mr. Argenziano 
would be prejudiced by such an amendment. Ms. Feldman then renewed her 
motion to amend, this time, asserting Rule l 5(b ). Again the trial court determined 
Mr. Argenziano would be prejudiced by such a last-minute amendment. 
Ms. Feldman argues that Mr. Argenziano tried that unpleaded issue by 
implied consent, because she raised it in her trial brief and he did not object. 
However, the consent must be evident from the record and here it is not. The 
reason it is not is because Ms. Feldman's claim is factually incorrect. At the 
pretrial conference, just days after trial Briefs were filed, Mr. Argenziano's counsel 
did raise the issue to object. The record would be a little clearer had Jvls. 
Feldman's counsel not talked over him, but Argenziano's counsel was objecting to 
her pre 2009 evidence. More importantly though, at that pretrial Jvls. Feldman 
agreed that there was no need for written objections and the objections could be 
made at trial. Per that agreement, Mr. Argenziano objected and there was no 
consent. 
Ms. Feldman also misconstrnes the rule and case law. She misses or ignores 
the fact that Mr. Argenziano objected to her evidence as being outside the scope of 
the pleadings. When a party objects, the trial court is not required to amend the 
pleading. Rather, it must assess whether the objecting party will be prejudiced by 
13 
admitting the evidence objected to. Here the trial court found that Mr. Argenziano 
would be prejudiced. 
While application of Rule 15(b) is a legal question, the trial court's 
determination regarding implied consent and prejudice is fact-intensive and the 
t,.;al court~" g~uon °1·,-,ad rl,5r-1·0 t1"on ; n th -::it rJptpr·n11·nation ThP tri~ 1 ro11rt'<:: 1.1 L J...:) l V V.L..1 .LJ V - UJ. V VL .L.L J..L.I. L-.L..&.I...LL. '-'-"-'" "'-' J....i. . _ t... \...t. ..., __._ ..... .._..._v ...,.._..,C..,..., v _..._ V 
detennination was supported by the evidence, and well within its discretion. 
Prejudice is a fachrnl inquiry. In essence Ms. Feldman attacks the 
underpinnings of the trial court's finding. To do so though, she is required to 
marshal the evidence that supported the trial court's finding of prejudice and then 
show the finding to be against the clear weight of that evidence. Ms. Feldman 
recognizes that the trial court found prejudice to Mr. Argenziano. Appellant's Br. 
p.p. 5, 13, 21. But then she presents no reason why the trial court ened in finding 
prejudice 
In fact, much of Ms. Feldman's appeal disputes, or takes issue with the 
comi's factual findings. She explicitly contends the trial court's findings 
"decidedly against the clear weight of the evidence" on two issues: voluntary 
underemployment and the court's determination of income for suppm1 purposes. 
Appellant's Br. p.p. 36-37. Consequently, Ms. Feldman is required to marshal the 
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evidence in support of those findings . Then she must demonstrate that such 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Ms. Feldman fails to marshal the evidence on both those issues. And she 
never demonstrates how the trial comi's determinations are against the clear weight 
of the evidence. On that basis alone, this Comi should deny Ms. Feldman's appeal 
on those claims. 
Moreover, Ms. Feldman cannot demonstrate that the trial court's 
determination on those two issues (voluntary underemployment and income) is 
against the weight of the evidence, because both determinations, and the trial 
court's findings of fact, were supported. Ms. Feldman had the burden of 
establishing her claims on both and she simply failed to meet those burdens. 
Regarding prerequisites for imputing income, Ms. Feldman relies on old case 
law for the proposition that voluntary underemployment is a necessary prerequisite 
to imputing income. Subsequent amendments to Utah statute have removed that 
requirement. 
Likewise, she is incorrect that the trial court had to use historical income as 
the basis for determining Mr. Argenziano's income for prospective child support. 
Using historical rather than actual income might be appropriate if the trial court 
found that Mr. Argenziano had changed jobs simply to lower his support 
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obligation. That is the thrust of the voluntary underemployment analysis. What 
Ms. Feldman misses is that "life happens," and it is not always for the better. The 
evidence showed that to be the case here, and the trial court found that Mr. 
Argenziano was not voluntarily underemployed. That being the case, the trial comi 
was faced with either using actual income for prospective support, or applying a 
"matrix'' of factors in determining an appropriate income. Trial comis are granted 
broad discretion in determining income for support purposes. Here the 
determination was based on a "totality" or matrix of factors. After reviewing those 
factors, the trial court chose to use the amount determined by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for persons similarly situated. This amount was somewhat higher than 
Mr. Argenziano's actual income and within the bounds of the trial court 's 
discretion. 
V/aiver 
Ms. Feldman argues that the trial court effectuated an improper waiver by 
denying her last-minute motion to amend the Complaint to seek support back four 
more years. Her procedural failure to properly plead her case to give Mr. 
Argenziano notice of the extent of her claim, however, is not the equivalent of a 
court ruling that she had waived it. The trial court made no such ruling and no 
amount of spin can change what the comi did rule. 
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Contempt 
A decision to not hold a pmiy in is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ,r 14, 294 P.3d 600. The trial court found 
that, at the time in question, Mr. Argenziano did not have the ability to pay. It did 
not abuse its discretion because the evidence showed that at the time in question 
Mr. Argenziano and his family had gone through a serious of events (including 
Hmricane Sandy) that took away his ability to pay. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Ms. Feldman's Rule lS(b) 
Motion to Amend the Pleadings. 
Implied Consent and the Record 
Ms. Feldman contends that the issue of retroactivity back to 2005 was tried 
by implied consent because she raised it in her trial Brief and Mr. Argenziano did 
not respond to it. Utah law however, requires that the "implied consent of the 
parties must be evident from the record." Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 412 
(Utah 1998). Here, such consent is not evident in the record. In fact , the record 
shows Mr. Argenziano always objected to retroactivity beyond March 2009, and 
never consented to trying that unpleaded issue. 
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The trial court was clear in its view: "Respondent has been consistently and 
openly opposed to retroactive child support and did not conduct discovery for those 
time periods."4 Memorandum Decision, R. 2559. That was suppo1ied in the 
record. R. 2574, Trial Tr., 9: 13-25; 16: 1-8. Indeed, one cannot review the trial 
transcript; or any other court document and find true evidence of implied consent to 
try the issue of retroactive support predating March 2009. 
Contrary to Ms. Feidman's assertions, any time the issue was brought up in a 
meaningful context, Argenziano's counsel objected. See Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 
2007 UT App 243, ,I 38, 166 P.3d 639,650 (no consent to try issue where opposing 
party objected to "introduction of new claims whenever they arose"). 
As her sole basis for implied consent, Ms. Feldman claims she raised the 
issue on August 21, 2013 in her trial Brief. According to her, implied consent 
oppmiunity to conduct additional discovery on the issue. '' Appellant's Br. p. 33 . It 
is somewhat unclear why Mr. Argenziano would suddenly have the duty to reopen 
discovery in the face of her failure to amend her complaint. 5 See Eldridge, 2007 
4The "time periods" refened to are those periods predating the March 2009 
date alleged in Petitioner's Complaint. See Tr. Trans. R. 2574, 9: 13-25; 16: 1-8 
5 Her then counsel was aware of the unpleaded issue on November 18, 2012 
at the latest. Trial was a month away, and discovery had closed five months 
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UT App 243, ,r 40 ( quoting Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44 
at ilif 29-30, 87 P.3d 734 and noting that even in the context of Rule 15(b) 
"[m]otions to amend are typically deemed untimely when they are filed in the 
advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of 
discovery .... "). Nonetheless, Ms. Feldman is incorrect because a week later, Mr. 
Argenziano did object at the pretrial conference on August 28, 2013. 
At that short pretrial conference, the possible exhibits were discussed, 
including those that would support her new retroactivity claim. Argenziano's 
counsel stated that he was "going to be filing objections to Mr. Lieberman's 
witness [sic] list concerning several of the items that are in there."6 R. 2573, 
Pretrial Conf. Tr. 6:20-22 (Addendum C). He also noted that he was concerned 
about "whether or not [certain exhibits] should be admitted because they're either 
so remote that they're no longer relevant or - well, I - ... " R. 2573, Pretial Conf. 
Tr. 8:9-13 (Addendum C). Argenziano's counsel had also tried to note that tax 
returns for 2009 forward would be admissible, "but prior to 2009 were beyond the 
scope of the pleadings and thus irrelevant." R. 2527, Declaration of James A. 
earlier. 
6 Although counsel said "witness list" the later context and the fact that there 
would not be items on a witness list show that he clearly meant "exhibit list.' ' See 
Declaration of James A. McIntyre R. 2526 - 2528. 
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McIntyre. However, Ms. Feldman's counsel talked over him the first time he 
mentioned 2009.7 Id.; R. 2573, Pretrial Conf. Tr. 8:23-24 (Addendum C) (showing 
Mr. Lieberman talking over Mr. McIntyre when he starts to mention 2009). Thus, 
the issue was broached, and not in a consenting way. 
Of equal importance, at that pretrial conference the trial court had indicated 
that objections to exhibits could be handled "at the day of trial ... or as the exhibits 
are brought forward, unless you want to handle them separately." R. 2573,Tr. 
Pretrial Conf. 7: 18-20 (Addendum C). Ms. Feldman's counsel expressly agreed to 
that, saying: " ... I'm also fine with - with addressing all those issues at trial and, 
you know, so that Jvlr. McIntyre doesn't have to file a written objection and then I 
respond to that. You know, I'll have the offer, what I offer and he can make his 
objection at that time." Id. 8: 1-5 ( emphasis added). Thus, Ms. Feldman had 
n~-.. ,.,~ ,-1 +hn+ all ~i..: e~+:~ ~ n ···e'"e g~:~~ +~ h e, 1-.nn~led n+ +••1'nl 
ae,lCCU ll al 11 VUJ vUVll-' W 1 V.llle, LV UC 11a1 Ul al LL a1. 
In sum, Mr. Argenziano voiced some of his objections and concerns and 
tried to address others, but Ms. Feldman agreed objections could be made at trial, 
and they were. See Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, ,r 38, 166 P.3d 
639, 650 (no implied consent where pmiy objects). Ms. Feldman cannot now 
complain that more specific objections were not raised during the pretrial. 
7Ms. Feldman's current appellate counsel did not represent her at the time. 
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Ms. Feldman also takes Mr. Argenziano to task for not "asking for the 
oppmiunity to conduct additional discovery on the issue." Appellant's Br. p. 33. 
This improperly shifts the burden where discovery was long-closed and her 
Complaint expressly set a date, March 2009, as well as stating that reimbursement 
beyond that date would be by separate application, if at all. R. 2, 5, Complaint ,r,r 
7, 19. Moreover, when it became clear to Ms. Feldman that the issue of 
retroactivity back to 2005 might not be tried, she could have asked for a 
postponement to allow amendment and give Mr. Argenziano time to prepare. She 
did not do that. 
Finally, the issue was first raised in a "pleading"8 on the morning of trial in 
Ms. Feldman's oral motion to amend her complaint. But that only happened after 
Mr. Argenziano raised his objection very early on to any evidence regarding 
support back to 2005. R. 2574 Trial Tr. 8:24 - 9:25. So, no implied consent arose 
at that time. See Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 24 3, ,r 3 8, 166 P .3 d 63 9, 
650 (no implied consent where party objects). 
The Cases 
The cases Ms. Feldman cites do not support her claims either. She is co1Tect 
that Colman v. Colman, 742 P.2d 782, 785 (Ut App. 1987) posits that under Rule 
8Technically a motion is not a pleading. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a). 
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15(b ), "[i]mplied consent may be found 'where one party raises an issue material to 
the other party's case or where evidence is introduced without objection ... where 
it "appear[ s] that the paiiies understood the evidence [was] to be aimed at the 
unpleaded issue."' Appellant's Br. p. 31 (citing Colman). But neither Colman, or 
any other case cited by Ms. Feldman, say that implied consent may be found where, 
as here, the opposing party specifically objects, especially after having conducted 
discovery properly based on the scope of the pleadings. 
Under the second prong, the evidence would have to have been "introduced 
without objection" (required under the rule itself) where it 'appears that the parties 
understood the evidence [was] to be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Colman, at 
785. Here, the aim of the evidence was at the unpleaded issue; but the trial court 
let it be presented conditionally, pending its decision on whether amendment 
should be allowed. 
are not met. 
According to Ms. Feldman, in Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, 
this Court found that a trial court properly found implied consent to try an 
unpleaded issue where an accounting had been requested and the "husband was 
aware of the issue at the pretrial conference, and pretrial Brief included the issue." 
Appellant's Br. p. 32. 
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The language in Shinkoskey regarding pretrial Briefs is critical to Ms. 
Feldman as that is the sole basis for her claim. But her quoted language 
misinterprets the real facts in Shinkoskey. In Shinkosey, it was the opposing party -
the husband - whose "pretrial Brief included the issue." Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 
44, n. 2, 19 P.3d 1005, 1007. Additionally, the husband had conducted discovery 
on the issue - "deposing on of the donors before trial" - so not surprisingly he was 
unsuccessful at "establishing unfair surp1ise or other prejudice."9 Id. 
For Shinkoskey to be analogous, Mr. Argenziano would had to have 
presented the unpleaded issue in his trial Brief after conducting discovery 
regarding retroactivity to 2005. He did neither. 
Ms. Feldman cites Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5 th Cir. 
1983) for the proposition that an issue (a "Gunther claim") was tried by implied 
consent where it was raised in a pretrial memorandum. Appellant's Br. p. 32. But, 
as in her Shinkoskey reference, she omits that in Plemer, it was the opposing party, 
"[ defendant] Parsons-Gil bane [who] addressed the Gunther issue in its pret1ial 
memorandum." Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1132, n. 5. Moreover, in Plemer both parties 
signed off on the pretrial order, which "contained a Gunther claim." Id. Again, 
that is not this case. 
9The decision does not note whether the husband objected at trial. 
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Ms. Feldman cites Rodriguez v. Doral Jvftg. Corp. , 57 F. 3d 1168 (1 st Cir. 
1996) for the simple idea that "implied consent may be found in the case of pretrial 
memorandum to which the opponent does not object." Appellant's Br. p. 33 (citing 
Rodriguez, at p. 1172). In Rodriguez, however, nobody's pretrial memoranda 
raised the controverted issue, and even the plaintiff herself did not mention it at 
trial. Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1171. Rather, it was the trial judge who injected the 
unpleaded issue into his judgment sua sponte, "[pulling it] out from beneath his 
robe, like a rabbit from a magician's hat." Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1172. 
Accordingly the language in Rodriguez, about pretrial memoranda is about 
something that did not happen. It is dicta and no Utah court has cited Rodriguez, 
for the proposition Ms. Feldman cites it for. Even so, it has no application here. 
Here both parties filed their trial memoranda on the same day, (R. 1730 - 1745), 
Argenziano tried to object, but was cut off by counsel, who then agreed that 
objections could be heard later at trial. In keeping with that agreement, Mr. 
Argenziano did object. Supra. 
The Rule 
Rule l 5(b) is broken into two, almost mutually exclusive parts. The first 
paii deals with issues tried by "explicit or implicit consent." Where such consent 
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exists, the rule requires the court to treat those issues "in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). Prejudice to a party is not an 
issue. The two parts seem mutually exclusive though, because the second part 
deals with those instances where a party objects to the evidence as being outside 
the scope of the pleadings. If an issue was actually not raised in the pleadings and 
objected to, it is hard to see how a court could determine that hying the issue is 
consented to. The objection belies and repudiates any consent to try an unpleaded 
issue. For that reason alone, the cases cited by Ms. Feldman are largely inapposite. 
C1itically, under the plain language of Rule l 5(b ), where a party objects at 
trial, as here, the ability of the comi to even allow an amendment of the pleading is 
much different than under the first part. Amendment becomes discretionaiy, not 
mandatory, and even that discretion is limited. If objection is made, the court 
"may" allow amendment, but that is "when" two criteria are met: (1) the merits of 
the action must be subserved and, (2) the objecting pmiy must fail to convince the 
court that he will be prejudiced: 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the corni may allow the pleadings to be 
amended the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the comi that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (emphases added). 
The rule's plain language seems to say that if both predicates are not 
satisfied, the trial court may not allow amendment. The rule, however, has not 
been interpreted quite so tightly. Instead, where the objecting party satisfies the 
court that prejudice will result; the trial court "may grant or deny a party's motion 
for amendment upon any reasonable basis, and the comi's decision can be reversed 
only if abuse of discretion appears." Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, i[ 
19, 166 P.3d 639,646 (citation omitted). 
Here, there was an objection at trial, and the trial court found Mr. 
Argenziano had been openly opposed to retroactive child support and did not 
conduct discovery for those time periods." 10 Memorandum Decision, R. 2559. 
That was supp01ied in the record. R. 2574, Trial Tr., 9:13-25; 16:1-8. 
evaluate the second predicate of Rule 15(b)- was there prejudice? The trial court 
found that Mr. Argenziano would be prejudiced by going back four extra years to 
2005. Prejudice was first found in the context of Ms. Feldman's oral 15(a) motion, 
10The "time periods" referred to are those periods predating the March 2009 
date alleged in Petitioner's Complaint. See Tr. Trans. R. 2574, 9: 13-25; 16: 1-8 
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which she made on the morning of trial. After taking that motion under advisement 
and Briefing by the parties, the trial court ruled as follows: 
The parties stipulated to a scheduling order, and fact discovery expired on 
March 21, 2013. Respondent claimed that he had no notice of the intent to 
seek child support back to September 2005 until the filing of Petitioner's 
trial Brief [ on August 21, 2013]. Respondent indicated that he relied on the 
Complaint and conducted discove1y accordingly. 
* * * 
... The third factor deals with prejudice to the responding party in this 
situation which is the Respondent, not the Petitioner. Respondent did not 
conduct discovery with respect to the back child support and would be 
prejudiced in presenting evidence at trial. The third factor [prejudice] is met 
in favor of Respondent. 
Minute Entry Regarding Oral Trial Motion to Amend The Complaint With Respect 
to Child Support Prior to March 2009 R. 2146 - 47. 
One could say that "prejudice is prejudice." It likely does not change much, 
whether it is in the context of Rule l 5(a) or 15(6 ). 11 But by its plain language, if a 
party fails to object under Rule 15(6 ), the only inquiry is whether claims were tried 
by express or implied consent. On the other hand, where objection is made, the 
trial court must examine the prejudice factor. Id. 
11 Ms. Feldman implies that the trial court ened in not treating her l 5(a) 
motion as one under 15(6 ). However, the trial court addressed Rule 15(6) - after 
even more Briefing - in its Memorandum Decision. R. 2556-2561 . Any en-or on 
that score would be hannless. 
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For some reason, Ms. Feldman's argument ignores this factor. The thrust of 
her appeal is that there was implicit consent to try the issue and she cites several 
cases for various aspects of implied consent. Appellant's Br. p.p. 30-34. But she 
never mentions the word prejudice in her argument, much less does she address it. 
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the key factual finding that Mr. Argenziano would be prejudiced by amending the 
complaint at the 11 th hour. 
Ms. Feldman did recast her Rule 15(a) motion to amend into a motion under 
15(b). But the trial comi explicitly found - again - that there was prejudice when it 
denied that motion: "Respondent did not conduct discovery for those time periods, 
so Petitioner cannot say that the back child support issue was tried by consent. To 
now allow for child support between 2005-09 would prejudice Respondent." 
l'. ,f 1 r-- . . T\ ,..., "Sf'\ /'A 1v1emoranaum vec1s10n. K. LJ :1-ov. 
This finding was consistent with Utah law. "[T]he test for determining 
whether pleadings should be deemed amended under Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b) is 
"whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it could 
offer additional evidence if the case were retried on a different theory." Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P .2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (modified on other grounds, 
Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39) (quoting R.A. Pohl Const. Co. 
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v. J\1arshall, 640 F.2d 266, 267 (10th Cir.1981 )). Here, however, discovery had 
closed long before, and Mr. Argenziano had conducted discovery in accordance 
with the issues pleaded. 
II. The Law of The Case Doctrine Does Not Apply Here. 
Ms. Feldman claims that the t1ial court reserved retroactive child support 
"without limitation" and that under B.A.M. Dev., LLC v. Salt Lake County, this 
"express reservation" was somehow an immutable decision under the law of the 
case doctrine. Appellant's Br. p. 34 citing B.A.lvl. 2012 UT 26, ~ 34. Factually and 
legally this is incorrect. 
Factually, the claim that retroactivity was reserved "without limitation" is 
just her spin on it. Nowhere does the trial comi ever use that term, and one could 
just as easily and more logically insert "as pleaded," so as to say "the issue of 
retroactive supp01i is reserved as pleaded." Indeed, had Ms. Feldman obtained a 
default judgment at all those times where the trial court said it reserved the issue, 
there would be no retroactive application further than her Complaint alleged. See 
Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1983) (relief granted in a default not to 
exceed or substantially differ from the complaint.) 
Still, it is the trial court that is in the best position to interpret its own 
pronouncements. Just as the trial court is in the best position to gauge the 
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credibility of witnesses and demeanor, and run the trial itself, so too it is the best 
arbiter and interpreter of what it said. Although stated in the context of discovery 
sanctions, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that district courts have "a great deal 
of latitude in clete1mining the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court 
business because the district court judge is in the best position to evaluate the status 
of his or her cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties." 
Bodell Const. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, if 35, 2i5 P.3d 933, 943 (citation, 
internal quotes and brackets omitted). So where there is an ambiguity or alternative 
interpretation of what a trial court imposed or reserved, it is for the trial court to 
interpret within a large latitude. 12 
Here, the trial comi was in the best position to "evaluate the status of the 
case" and claiify what claims were reserved. It found that its reservations of 
retroactive child support were reservations in the context of lvfs. Feldman's 
pleadings. Specifically, the trial court noted the complaint sought support back to 
March 2009, the parties entered into a stipulation that determined current and 
retroactive child support back to July 2009. Ms. Feldman tried to enforce support 
retroactive to July 2009 in the hearing on November 23, 2010. R. 2557. She did 
not request support back to 2005, and no side ever "raised the issue of retroactive 






child suppmi prior to 2009 in any pleadings or at the hearings." R. 2557; see R. 
2146 (additionally noting that discovery had closed) . The trial comt did not, but 
could have also noted that the Complaint specifically pleaded that reimbursement 
earlier than March 2009 would be by separate application. Complaint ir 19, R. 4. 
Ms. Feldman also misunderstands the law of the case doctrine, which 
actually addresses several distinct sets of problems. Thurston v. Box Elder Cnty., 
892 P.2d 1034, 1038 n.2 (Utah 1995). The one at issue in B.A.lvf. was the "mandate 
rule," which applies after a case has been remanded on appeal. B.A.M. 2012 UT 
26, ,11. It "binds both the district court and the pmiies to honor the mandate of the 
appellate comt." IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, if 28, 
196 P.3d 588, 597. 
However, the doctrine does not preclude a court from modifying its orders or 
even moving in a different direction while an unappealed matter is still before the 
district court. "As long as the case has not been appealed and remanded, 
reconsideration of an issue before a final judgment is within the sound discretion of 
the district comt." IHC Health Servs., 2008 UT 73, ,r 27, 196 P.3d 588,596. The 
pmties of course are bound by the court ' s decision until it changes, "but the court 
remains free to reconsider that decision." .Mid Am. Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc, 
2009 UT 43, ,r 12, 216 P.3d 352, 355 (quoting IHC Health Servs. ,r27). The law of 
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the case doctrine did not restrict the trial court from interpreting its own language 
regarding the reservation of an issue. 
III. Ms. Feldman Attacks Factual Findings, But Fails to Marshal The 
Evidence in Support of Those Findings and Demonstrate That 
They Are Not Supported. 
~ lthf"'\11gl1 r-lot"hPr1 in tl,e f:abr1· (' of ~1·g11mpnts ahf'ltlt L"'gal rulingc: r.n C:P~/Pr'.Cl 1 
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issues Appellant's Brief just takes issue with the trial court's factual findings. 
Specifically, she disputes the trial court ' s finding: (1) that Mr. Argenziano was 
voluntarily underemployed; (2) determining Mr. Argenziano' s income for support 
purposes; (Appellant's Br. p.p. 26-27, 36-37, 39, 42); and (3) implicitly that Mr. 
Argenziano would be prejudiced by the last-minute amendment to seek support 
retroactively to 2005. 
Those issues are critical to the appeal, so Ms. Feldman is required to marshal 
the evidence. "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The 
appellant must "then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,I 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (as quoted in Taylor v. Taylor, 
2011 UT App 331, ,I 8,263 P.3d 1200, 1202, brackets omitted). Ms. Feldman has 
not done so in these areas. 
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When she argues the trial comi's findings are against the weight of the 
evidence, Ms. Feldman challenges the trial court's findings. Determining whether 
voluntary underemployment exists, or what income is appropriate, or whether a 
paiiy will be prejudiced - those are all factual determinations, or at the least, very 
fact sensitive. "Even where [paiiies] purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as 
here, if a detennination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal 
standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the [paiiies] also have a duty to marshal the 
evidence." Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ~ 22, 217 P.3d 733, 744 
(quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ~ 20, 100 P.3d 1177). 
Marshaling is a burden that appellants often overlook or disregard. W 
Valley Cityv. Nlajesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The 
Appellant's Brief here is no exception and sets forth a common theme, similar to 
that found in Majestic. In that case, on appeal West Valley City purp01ied to attack 
the court's conclusions of law. But it "actually [ did] so as a guise to challenging 
the court's factual findings." Majestic, 818 P.2d at 1315. As here, the essence of 
its argument was that "the evidence did not support the court's finding." Id.; 
compare Appellant's Br.. p.p . 36-37, 39. Where a "challenge to the legal 
conclusions rises and falls with the factual findings sought to be challenged .. . 
[this Court should] leave undisturbed the court's findings and the conclusions based 
thereon." Mqjestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. 
Marshaling and Voluntary Underemployment 
Ms. Feldman maintains the imputation of income analysis requires a "two-
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income ought to be imputed." Appellant's Br. p. 36. She claims both components 
are "decidedly against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. p.p. 36-37. Or, as she 
put it another way: "the only conclusion suppmied by the clear weight of the 
evidence is that Mr. Argenziano was voluntarily under employed when he left his 
position at Newbridge ... " Id. p. 39. Yet nowhere does Appellant's Brief even 
mention marshaling the evidence on any issue, much less gather the evidence that 
supported the trial court's finding that he was not voluntarily underemployed. Nor 
does she show how the findings were not supported by the evidence. See 
Appellant's Br.. generally. As shown below, the evidence does support the tiial 
court's findings. Accordingly this Court should disregard Ms. Feldman's 
arguments regarding voluntary underemployment. 13 
Marshaling and Imputation of Income 
13The issue may also be moot. As shown later, while voluntary 
underemployment may still be a factor, it is no longer a statutory prerequisite for 
imputing income. 
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As with voluntary underemployment, Ms . Feldman contends the trial court's 
find ing as to "how much income ought to be imputed" is "decidedly against the 
clear weight of the evidence." Appellant's Br.. p.p. 36- 37. Indeed, she argues that 
"historical income provides the best evidence of [Mr. Argenziano' s] earning 
capacity" and "there is no evidence at all in the record that Mr. Argenziano's 
individual earning capacity diminished at all, only that he left one position and 
accepted a position that paid substantially less." Appellant's Br. p. 42. In sh01i, 
she argues that the evidence did not support the trial comi's finding that for 
prospective child support, Mr. Argenziano's income was "$77,320.00 annually or 
$6,443.33/monthly from 2011 to present." R. 2219. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining a party's income for 
support purposes. (Infra.) Here, the trial court considered a broad range of factors, 
including the impact of the recession, past employment, the job market and skills. 
R. 2560. As with the issue of voluntary underemployment, however, Ms. Feldman 
disputes the evidentiary bases for the trial court's finding regarding income. Yet 
she marshals none of the evidence that supported the trial court's finding. 
Similar to here, in Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, 76 P.3d 716 the 
husband contended on appeal, "that the trial court miscalculated Wife's income as 
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well as her monthly expenses ... " Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ,r 10. This Court 
disposed of that claim quickly: 
When challenging a finding, Appellant "must first marshal all [ ofJ the 
evidence that supports the finding and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence the finding is so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence.' " The marshaling requirement is a prerequisite to 
our examination of the finding. " 'If the appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record suppmis the finding[ ] 
of the trial court.. .. ' " 
Here, however, Husband simply reargues the evidence he presented at trial, 
and he ignores the factual support for the trial comi's decision to award Wife 
$1,000 in monthly alimony. Consequently, we conclude Husband has failed 
to meet his marshalling obligation and, thus, we assume the record supports 
the trial court's finding. 
Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ,r 10, 76 P.3d 716, 719 (quoting Wilde v. vVilde, 2001 UT 
App 318,, 29, 35 P.3d 341 (alterations in original; citations omitted). 
As in Davis, this Court should conclude the record supports the trial court's 
finding regarding lv1r. Argenziano's income. 
Marshaling and Prejudice Arising From a Late Amendment of Pleadings 
The existence of prejudice is a factual determination. See Chandler v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356,358 (Utah 1992) (in the context of 
compelling arbitration "the finding of both substantial paiiicipation and prejudice 
are factual determinations"). Here, Ms. Feldman fails to marshal evidence in 
support of the trial court's finding that Mr. Argenziano would be prejudiced by her 
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l S(b) motion to amend. She also utterly fails to show why Mr. Argenziano would 
not be prejudiced by allowing amendment on the morning of trial. Accordingly, 
this Court should not countenance any claims that Mr. Argenziano was not 
prejudiced. Therefore, Ms. Feldman's argument that the trial comi had to allow 
ainendment under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) cannot pass muster. 
IV. The Trial Court's Findings Regarding Voluntary 
Underemployment, Determination of Income, and Prejudice Were 
Supported by Evidence. 
Irrespective of Ms. Feldman's failure to marshal (supra.), the evidence 
supported the trial court's findings regarding voluntary underemployment, income 
for support purposes and prejudice. 
The Trial Court's Findings Regarding Voluntary Underemployment and 
Income 
The issue of voluntary underemployment and how much income to "impute" 
or use for determining child supp01i are two closely-tied issues. Logically, a court 
is more likely to impute a higher income where an obligor purposely opts for lower 
income to reduce support obligations. "However, a finding of voluntary 
underemployment does not require a comi to impute the higher income; it merely 
allows it to do so. Thus, the court maintains its 'broad discretion to select an 
appropriate method of assessing a spouse's income.'" Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT 
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App 139, if 17, 233 P.3d 836, 841-42 (quoting Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 
1019 (Utah Ct.App.1998); and citing Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 964-65 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994) and Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah Ct.App.1998); 
see also Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, ,r 12,200 P.3d 223,227 (in dealing 
with alimony and imputation of income; trial court has discretion because it is in an 
advantaged position to weigh evidence, determine its persuasive value and 
conclude whether a party is capable of employment). But because voluntary 
underemployment and the income assessed for support are closely tied, it is 
appropriate to view the supporting evidence together. 
The trial court's findings and the underlying evidence are much more 
nuanced than simply showing that Mr. Argenziano "left one position and accepted 
a position that paid substantially less," as Ms. Feldman puts it. Appellant's Br. p. 
voluntarily underemployed or impute income. Rather, in its Memorandum 
Decision denying Ms. Feldman's Rule 59(a) and (b) Motion for a New Trial (R. 
2556 -2562), the trial com1 acknowledged that "perhaps it used the word 'impute' 
inconectly." R. 2560. But it went on to explain that: 
the Com1 noted the inconsistency of Respondent's income from year 
to year, the effect of the recession on the financial services industry 
and the volatile economy. The Court considered Respondent's past 
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employment, his skills, the realities of the job market and the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics ("BLS") in determining what a reasonable income 
should be [prospectively]. The Comi noted that Respondent had no 
recent histo1y of high wages with his cunent employer. In totality, the 
Court determined that the BLS figure was the appropriate means in 
determining support payments. Petitioner argues [in her motion for a 
new trial] that the Court cannot rely solely on BLS information; but 
the Court's explanation on unce1iainties of fluctuating histo1ical 
amounts and the nexus to the BLS figures is adequate to explain the 
Court's decision. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Second, the trial court was correct in its assessment because, as it noted, Ms. 
Feldman did not meet her burdens regarding either voluntary underemployment or 
imputation of income. R. 2560-2561. "The proponent of a proposition has two 
burdens relative to his proof: to produce evidence which proves or tends to prove 
the proposition asse1ied; and to persuade the trier of fact that his evidence is more 
credible or entitled to the greater weight." Koes ling v. Basamalds, 539 P.2d 1043, 
1046 (Utah 1975). Ms. Feldman was the petitioner and proponent of the claim that 
Mr. Argenziano was voluntarily underemployed - that is to say that the trial comi 
should have imputed a higher level of income. Throughout the trial she had the 
burden of "production" and "persuasion." vVestmont _J\1irador LLC v. Shurtliff, 
2014 UT App 184, ,I 19, 333 P.3d 369, 374 (citing Basamakis, 539 P.2d at 1046). 
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The trial corni found that Ms. Feldman "ha[ d] no evidence to back up her 
assertion [of voluntary underemployment]." R. 2560. And "[she] provided no 
testimony, expert or evidence, in her favor to rebut the testimony of Respondent" 
(id. R. 2561), who the trial court found to be a credible witness regarding his 
arnpl/"\ymont D ':>21 0 i::;-ni::;-rT ~ ~2 ,-. 
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An impo1iant issue was the impact of the "Great Recession" on the financial 
services industry where Mr. Argenziano was employed, and the volatility of that 
industry. R. 2561. Another issue was how that impacted Mr. Argenziano's 
employment and what happened with him specifically. The trial court found the 
recession had a significant effect on the brokerage industry and Mr. Argenziano's 
income. R. 2216, FOFCL 1119, 20. The main witness regarding the industry was 
Mr. Argenziano (and to a lesser extent, his wife). The trial court specifically found 
him to be credible regarding his employment. R. 2219, FOFCL 7132.c. However, 
Ms. Feldman offered no witnesses regarding that industry or, more specifically, the 
"boutique fin11s" that employed Mr. Argenziano. See R. 2212 -2226, FOFCL; see 
also R. 2574 generally (the trial transcript, which shows Ms. Feldman presented 
only two witnesses: herself and Mr. Argenziano). Indeed, Ms. Feldman "did not 
provide any evidence or expert testimony rebutting Father's testimony, his 
profession, his employment opportunities, his alleged voluntary under employment, 
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employment situation for persons similarly situated to Father, the pay rates 
available at boutique fin11s, and any job descriptions and duties for a managing 
director." R. 2219 FOFCL ,133. After review based on Ms. Feldman's Rule 59(a) 
and (b) Motion for New T1ial, the trial court reiterated Ms. Feldman's failure to 
present evidence to suppo11 claims. She "provided no testimony, expe1t or 
evidence [to suppmt her claim that Mr. Argenziano was voluntarily 
underemployed]." R. 2561. 
As an example of what one misses by failing to marshal, Ms. Feldman argues 
that Mr. Argenziano quit his job at Newbridge Securities to lower his payments. 
See Appellant's Br.. p.p. 23-25, 38. That is the thrust of a claim of voluntary 
underemployment. See Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, i1 16 and argument 
supra about "applicable law." To support that claim, she draws this Court's 
attention to his testimony that he left Newb1idge because of "capital issues" - as if 
that was an excuse and that what he really sought was to lower his income, so as to 
lower his child suppmt obligation. Appellant's Br.. p.p. 38; Id. 23-24 ( citing T1ial 
Tr.). 
While that might be one logical inference, other evidence did not support it. 
Ms. Feldman fails to inform that "capital issues" were not the only reason - and 
perhaps not the most important reason for leaving Newbridge. The evidence was 
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that Argenziano or Newbridge "had built a pipeline for [ certain types of 
transactions]" but the market for them dried up in the early part of 2011. R. 2574, 
Trial Tr. 134:8-12. As a consequence, "for the first and second quaiter of 2011, 
nothing was earned" at Newbridge. Id. 134:24-25 (emphasis added). Mr. 
A rgPn7iann ,~r~Q not OPttina n~id ~t 1\:J,::,u ,h1·1·doP and h~d nnt hPPD na1·r1 tbPrP fnr 
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many months. 
True, the triai comi found that Mr. Argenziano finaily ieft Newbridge in 
June of 2011 because of "capital issues." But it also found that he had "was forced 
to look for new employment" and "had no income for a period 8 months." R. 2216, 
FOFCL ~~ 21, 22. That was the time he was at Newbridge, before going to work at 
Rockwell. To be sure there was reduction in income, but it occurred at Newbridge, 
when Mr. Argenziano's income there fell to zero. Under those circumstances, the 
evidence supported trial court and it was well within its discretion to find that lvfr. 
Argenziano's leaving Newbridge did not effect a voluntary underemployment. He 
left a job where he had not been paid for months. 
The Trial Comi's Findings Regarding Prejudice 
The trial court was well within bounds when it found that Mr. Argenziano 
would be prejudiced by allowing the last-minute amendment of the Complaint. In 
keeping with the posture of the pleadings, Mr. Argenziano had not conducted 
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discovery regarding retroactive child support beyond 2009. His exhibit list 
contained nothing predating 2009. R. 1749-50. His intenogatories and requests 
for production of documents sought information only from 2009 forward. R. 2065. 
Another support order existed. And although it may have been rendered a nullity 
later, had Ms. Feldman specified she was seeking suppmi to 2005, Mr. Argenziano 
would have deposed the obligor on that order (Micah Reller). Similarly, he would 
also have conducted discovery regarding Ms. Feldman's income and employment. 
In his trial preparation, Mr. Argenziano was not prepared to address his income or 
business expenses predating 2009. R. 2067. In short, Mr. Argenziano provided the 
court with ample bases from which the trial court could conclude that he was 
prejudiced by Ms. Feldman's last-minute attempt to amend her complaint to seek 
reimbursement of supp01i back to 2005 . The trial court was well within its 
discretion to find that Mr. Argenziano would be prejudiced if amendment was 
allowed. R. 2147. 
V. Ms. Feldman is Incorrect About Applicable Law. 
Ms. Feldman is inconect about the law regarding voluntary 
underemployment. She cites numerous cases for the proposition that a decrease in 
income can be a basis for finding voluntary underemployment - that is, where the 
new, lower paying employment is the result of a voluntary choice. Appellant's Br. 
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p.p. 39 -40. But those cases are not applicable here. None of them support the 
proposition that leaving a job where you have not been paid for many months to 
find a job that does pay is voluntary underemployment. Nor logically could they. 
Still Ms. Feldman argues the trial court had to find that Mr. Argenziano was 
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current earnings shall be used to determine whether and underemployment .. . 
situation exists."14 Appellant's Briefp. 38 (citing Utah Code Ann. §78B-12-
203(5)(c)). However, historical and current ean1ings are not the only factors that a 
court considers. Statute does not say that they are and case law is clear that merely 
considering historical income would be error. 1--lall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) ( a drop in income is "merely one element" in the required 
analysis); see Utah Code Ann. §78B-l 2-203 (7)(b) (if income is imputed, the trial 
court is to consider employment potential and probable earnings). 
14Ms. Feldman is also incorrect in claiming voluntary unemployment is a 
prerequisite to imputing income. Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, which she 
relies on was decided January 20, 2012. But that requirement was removed 
effective May 8, 2012. Food Stamp Reference Amendments, 2012 Utah Laws Ch. 
41 (H.B. 180). And contrary to Ms. Feldman 's claim, Rayner v. Rayner, does not 
say that the "[voluntary underemployment] inquiry remains necessary." 
Appellant's Br. p. 37, n. 18 (citing Rayner, 2013 UT App 269. 'ifl0 n.4) Rather, it 
says "we conclude that voluntary unemployment and underemployment remain 
relevant ... " Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ino n.4 (emphasis added). 
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The goal of the underemployment analysis is "to prevent parents [ and 
spouses] from reducing their child support or alimony by purposefid 
unemployment or underemployment." Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ,r 16, 
272 P.3d 748, 754 (quoting Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998), affd, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255; (emphasis in Busche; additional 
citation omitted)). In accord with that goal, "cun-ent earnings, as compared to his 
historical income, is merely one element in the matrix of factual issues affecting 
the ultimate finding of whether [Mr. Argenziano] is underemployed." Busche, 
2012 UT App 16, ,r 22 (emphasis added) . 
The case of Hall v. Hall, (supra .) is illustrative. There, Mr. Hall had a 
lucrative career in the computer business in Utah, averaging over $100,000 per 
year in income. Just days before trial he staiied a new job in Vancouver ea111ing 
only $40,000. "[T]he trial court concluded that the only way to accurately gauge 
appellant's income for purposes of determining his support obligations was to rely 
on [Mr. Hall's] historical earnings." Hall, 858 P.2d atl023. In essence then, the 
trial court in Hall determined that Mr. Hall was voluntarily underemployed and 
imputed income based on historical rather than actual current earnings. Yet in 
Hall, as here, "some evidence suggest[ ed] that appellant's current, diminished 
income level resulted not from his personal preference or voluntary decisions, but 
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instead resulted from events beyond his control." Hall, 858 Pd. at 1025. 
Consequently, this Couri could not simply affirm on the basis of undisputed record 
evidence. It did, however, give directive findings regarding voluntary 
underemployment: 
Although the trial court found that appellant is currently earning less than he 
was previously, that isolated finding does not answer the critical question of 
whether the drop in earnings was voluntary. Rather, appellant's current 
earnings, as compared to his historical income, is merely one element in the 
matrix of factual issues affecting the ultimate finding of whether appellant is 
underemployed. Many critical questions are left unanswered: What are 
appellant's abilities? Is appellant's cmTent salary below the prevailing market 
for a person with his abilities? Are there any job openings for a person with 
appellant's abilities? At a minimum, the trial court must determine appellant's 
employment capacity and earnings potential- which it failed to do even in 
its determination of the amount to impute under section (7)(b )-before it 
could logically conclude that he is, in fact, underemployed. Inasmuch as 
there are no subsidiary findings showing that the trial couri actually found 
that a person with appellant's abilities could be earning more in the relevant 
market, we cannot imply a finding that appellant is underemployed. 
u ~n g~o D "'ld t 1 n26 111.Ul, .JO I .L., a l V . 
Hall is on all fours with the trial comi's decision here, except that here the 
trial court was presented with virtually undisputed evidence on the issues, and did 
enter findings. It was Ms. Feldman's burden, but from the evidence adduced the 
trial court declined to find that Mr. Argenziano was underemployed. Inter alia, the 
trial comi made the following findings of fact: The economy went into a recession 
in 2008, which had a significant effect on the brokerage industry that was Mr. 
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Argenziano's livelihood. R. 2216. Many of his friends in the same industry lost 
their jobs and have not found replacement jobs. Id. In 2009, Mr. Argenziano went 
work for Newbridge Securities as an independent contractor and in 2010 he had a 
good year financially because deals he had been working on for over two years 
were finalized. But then Mr. Argenziano learned that Newbridge "was having 
capital issues, and he wasforced to look/or new employment." Id. (emphasis 
added). He then went to work for Rockwell, but Rockwell stopped paying him and 
"he eventually terminated his position because of non-payment in November 2012. 
Id. ( emphasis added). In addition, Hunicane Sandy struck the area where Mr. 
Argenziano lives and disrupted his personal life and business life with Rockwell. 
Not surprisingly, after not being paid, Mr. Argenziano then went to work for 
another company, Du Pasquier, but it did not pay him either. Id. 2216 -17. Mr. 
Aregenziano then went to work at more stable position as managing director at 
Forefront Capital, where as of trial, he was on a base salary of $6,000 per month 
($72,000 annually). 
The trial court expressly found that Mr. Argenziano's "testimony regarding 
his employment was credible." R. 2219. The trial court also found: 
[Ms. Feldman] did not provide any evidence or expert testimony rebuting 
regarding [Mr. Argenziano's] testimony, his profession, his employment 
opportunities, his alleged voluntary underemployment, employment situation 
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Id. 
for persons similarly situated to [Mr. Argenziano], the pay rates available at 
boutique, and any job description and duties for a managing director. 
Ms. Feldman just did not meet her burden of establish voluntary 
underemployment. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975) . 
.t-..1oreover, from those findings, which have not been properly attacked on appeal, it 
is clear that the trial court was not obligated to find the Mr. Argenziano was 
voluntarily underemployed, and it did not. 15 
VI. Denying a Last-minute Motion to Amend Pleadings Under Rule 15 
is Not a Waiver of Child Support. 
Ms. Feldman argues that in denying her last-minute Rule l 5(b) motion to 
amend, the trial comi "prevent[ed] the recovery of retroactive support arrearages 
[ and] effectuated a waiver . . . contrary to the requirements set f01ih in Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-12-109." Appellant's Br. p. 36. To a ce1iain extent, this argument 
attacks something that did not happen. To be sure, the trial court was concerned 
about waiver as an issue before trial. However, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law do not find a waiver or even mention it. 16 R. 2212 -2226. 
Furthennore, the trial court explicitly disavowed any reliance on waiver, stating 
15The trial comi explained that it "perhaps used the word ' impute ' 
incorrectly" when it denied Ms. Feldman's motion for a new trial, R. 2560. 





"[t]he Court never stated that [Ms. Feldman] had waived her right to child support, 
merely that she had failed to comply with URCP 15." R. 2259. 
Moreover, Ms. Feldman conflates procedure with substance. Utah's Rules 
of Civil Procedure govern procedure "in all actions of a civil nature, whether 
cognizable at law or in equity ... " Utah R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 15(b) is the procedural 
rule Ms. Feldman chose to invoke. But now, having failed procedurally, she seeks 
to invoke a substantive concept, that of waiver. Taken on its face, Ms. Feldman 
simply contends that Utah Code Ann. §78B-12-109 trumps Rule 15(b) regarding 
the procedure litigants must follow. Apparently, Rule 15 and other procedural and 
even substantive restrictions can not apply in a child support case because Section 
109 precludes them. Taken to its logical conclusion, this implies that concepts like 
statutes of limitation, constitutional concerns regarding notice and opp01iunity to 
be heard, and rules of pleading are all for naught. Under Ms. Feldman's 
interpretation, if child support is involved, the plaintiff need not even bother to 
form the complaint in accordance with the minimal strictures of Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(a). Amendment at any time under Rule 15 would be permissible, because 
disallowing it would be a waiver. In that world, Section I 09 trumps, and there are 
no concerns regarding due process, such as notice and opportunity to be heard. 
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But parties have a constitutional due process right to prior notice of the 
nature and extent of claims against them. See e.g. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (ambiguous, inadequate or untimely notice deprives party 
of due process). Ruling that waiver trumps rules meant to implement constitutional 
protections ·would essentially exempt certain actions from those protections. That 
cannot be the law and it isn 't. No case law supports such an overarching impact of 
Section 109. Ivis. Feldman cites only Cahoon v. Evans, 2011 UT App 148 in 
support of her waiver argument. Appellant's Br. p.p. 35, 36. However, the waiver 
issue in Cahoon arose because the father claimed the mother had waived. Cahoon, 
2011 UT App 148, ~ 3. Rule 15(b) and concerns such as notice and prejudice were 
not at issue and so Cahoon does not support Ms. Feldman. And no other case cited 
by Ms. Feldman, or found by Mr. Argenziano, stands for the proposition that §78B-
12-109 precludes a trial court from disallowing a last-minute amendment to a four 
year old complaint under Rule 15. 
VII. The Trial Court Properly Declined to Find Contempt. 
A decision to not hold a party in is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ~ 14,294 P.3d 600. Here the trial comi 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that, at the time in question, Mr. Argenziano 
did not have the ability to pay. R. 2224, FOFCL ~60. Ms. Feldman essentially 
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asked the trial court to find Mr. Argenziano voluntarily underemployed and in 
contempt because he left a job where he had no income for months (see supra .) to 
take one at Rockwell Global Capital earning $12,000 per month as a salaried 
employee. That was not even underemployment (much less voluntary), because his 
employment with Rockwell offered a consistent income stream - as opposed to not 
being paid at Newbridge. Supra. It was not until after Rockwell terminated 
Father's salaried status in July 2012 (again leaving him with no income in August 
2012), that the "perfect storm" of events made it impossible for Father to pay his 
full suppmi obligation in January and February 2013. R. 2574,Trial Tr. 181:18 -
25; 182:1-25; 183:1-13. Because Mr. Argenziano lacked the ability to pay, the trial 
did not abuse any discretion in declining to hold him in contempt. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Feldman's appeal should be denied. She contends that under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15(b), implied consent existed to try her unpleaded claim for reimbursement 
of support retroactive to 2005. The record is clear that this last-minute claim was 
objected to at every step and there was no consent. She also dispute"s the trial 
court's factual findings regarding voluntary under employment, Mr. Argenziano's 
income for support purposes, and the prejudice that would inure to him from her 
last-minute attempt to amend the pleadings. Those claims fails because: (l)she did 
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not 1narshal the evidence and show that the trial comi's findings are against the 
weight of that evidence, and (2) the evidence supported the trial court's findings . 
Whether it "imputed" income or not, the tiial court's determination of Mr. 
Argenziano's income for support purposes was properly based on a totality or 
matrix of factors. It was not required to use historical income. Although it may 
still be a factor, voluntary underemployment is no longer a statutmy prerequisite to 
imputing income. 
Ms . Feldman claims the denial of her last-minute Rule 15 motion to amend 
effected an improper waiver of support under Utah Code Ann. 78B-12-109. But 
the statute cannot abrogate the constitutional requirement of notice. Ms . 
Feldman's failure to properly give constitutionally required notice of the extent of 
her claim is not a comi ruling that she had waived it, and the comi never ruled that 
i\!Is. Feldman contends the trial court erred in not finding Mr. Argenziano in 
contempt for not paying all hi child support during a certain period. However 
some of the same evidence that showed why he was not voluntarily underemployed 
al o showed why he lacked the ability to pay. The trial court was well within its 
I 
52 
discretion to decline to hold him in contempt. 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from 
any source, including earned and nonearned income sources which may include 
salaries, wages, cmmnissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, 
dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous 
maniages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers' 
compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement 
disability insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government 
programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-
time 40-hour job. If and only if during the time prior to the original support order, 
the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's 
job, the comi may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's 
ability to provide child support. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family 
Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability 
Insurance, Medicaid, SNAP benefits, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
( 4 )( a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be 
calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or 
business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-
employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an 
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support 
award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a 
reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of 
business income determined for tax purposes. 
• 
(5)(a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis 
and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of cun-ent income. Each parent shall 
provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax 
returns from at least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is 
not reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the 
Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer 
statements, and income tax returns. 
( c) Historical and cun-ent earnings shall be used to determine whether an 
underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the 
amount imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and 
the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work 
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same 
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
( c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, 
income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work 
week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the 
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of 
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
( d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the 
condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic 
job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial 
parent's presence in the home. 
(8)(a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent 
shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is 
based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. 
Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent 
depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
AddendumB 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which 
no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the 
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 21 days after it is served. 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of comi or by written 
consent of the adverse paiiy; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. A paiiy shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of 
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any paiiy at any time, even after 
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended 
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the comi that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The comi shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting pmiy to meet such 
evidence. 
( c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asse1ied in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occmTence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading. 
( d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the comi may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such ten11s as are just, pennit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting fo1ih transactions or occmTences or events which 
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. 
Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its 
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
MR . McINTYRE: Probably be able to do this in a half 
day , though , I think that's all we ' re scheduled for . 
MR. LIEBER!_v1~..N: That's what we're scheduled for and 
I think we should be fine. 
MR. McINTYRE : Okay . 
THE COURT : Okay . One second, Counsel . 
We ' re going back on the record with the matter of 
Reller vs . Argenziano , Case No . 094903937 . -
Counsel , if you' ll make your appearances for the 
record , please. 
MR. LIEBERivLA.N: Your Honor, Ben Lieberman for the 
petitioner . 
MR. McINTYRE : Jim McIntyre for the defend--or 
respondent, your Honor. 
THE COURT : Thank you . 
Counsel, let me just pull this up really quickly to 
see where we are at. I know we have a trial scheduled , but I 
think i t i s a full day, we set aside a full day . If we don't 
need the wnole day, t hen that's fine, but we didn't know how 






























MR . LIEBERMAN : My memory is that it was a half day . 
THE COURT : Was--oh , it is a half day on October 
MR . Mc I NTYRE : And the problem I have , your Honor , 
is--I don't know about Mr . Lieberman 's client, but my client 
has to fly in from New York to attend, along with his wife . 
MR. LI EBERMAN : I think we can make travel p lans 
based on a half a day . 
THE COURT : Yes . 
fv!..R • LIEBERMAN : I mean , I -- I envision it being- -
being probably half testimony and half a~gument. I think the 
.i ssue is--is , you know , just--
MR . McINTYRE : As long as we can get all the 
test i mony o u t of t he way , we could proba bly come b a ck at a 
later t i me to do argument but I just want to make sure we' ve 
got enough time to get testimony on . 
THE COURT : Okay. Well , if you'd like , we can block 
off the whole day. I mean, I know that you think it will be a 
half d a y . I have i t set from 9 : 00 ' til noon on Wednesday , 
O~tober 2nd . Is that still going to work for you all? 
MR . McINTYRE : I--I did get a curve ball with this 
request to i mpute the income , so I--I guess what' I ' m concerned 
about is, I don't know what--it seems to me it 's the 
petit i oner's burden to at least present the initia l evidence 





























my burden to rebut it , but I don't know exactly what Mr. 
Lieberman is planning. Are you going to just try and present 
my client as far as the in--inference that he's under -
emp l oyed? 
MR . LIEBERMAN : Well, I --yeah, I -- I mean, I - -we--
we've submitted our witness lists , I don ' t have any witnesses 
besides- - besides the parties . 
MR. McINTYRE: Right . But the witness list just 
says they 're going to testify about the subject matter. I 
don't know who's going to testify concerning under - employment 
and I don't know who you ' ve got in mind yet and your witness 
list doesn't tell me . 
MR . LIEBERt"VJAN : I -- I don ' t know that we-- I mean, 
obviously, the only witness that I have is your client . 
MR . McINTYRE: Okay . 
MR. LI EBERMAN: I --
MR. Mc I NTYRE : Well, that's fine . 
THE COURT : Okay. So will Octo--Wednesday , October 
2nd still work, Counsel? 
MR . McINTYRE: If--we've got - -
THE COURT : And there's a calendar- -
MR. McINTYRE : October 2nd ' s fine, your Honor. 
Would you mind blocking out the full day, just so that we 






































MR . McINTYRE : I don ' t want t o - - we may be turning 
everybody loose early, but --
THE COURT : That's fine . I ' d rather be safe than 
sorry . 
MR . McINTYRE : I would , too . 
THE COURT : So--and since we have that available , 
I 'l _ block it out ' til 5 : 00 o ' clock . If we get done sooner, 
then we get done sooner . T . J . , wi ll you make sure that 
happens in Couris , too , as well? Thank you . 
And then Counse l, are y ou going to - - you ' ve already 
exchanged exh i bit lists and things like that . Is that what 
I'm under s tanding? Pre-trial--
MR . McINTYRE : We - - we have exchanged those , your 
Honor. 
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR . McINTYRE : The--and the--along with the trial 
briefs. 
THE COURT : So there's no other things that need to 
be taken c~re of at this point? 
MR . McINTYRE : I 'm going to be f i ling objections to 
Mr . Li eberman ~s witnes s list concerning several of the items 
that are ~n there . 
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR . LIEBERMAN : The exh i bit list ? 



































exhibits within the exhibits. 
MR . LIEBERMAN : Oh . 
THE COURT : Okay . 
(Inaudible) 
MR . McINTYRE : I mean, one of the things you ' ve got 
is a BLS (?) for the wrong category of employment . 
MR. LIEBERJ.vl]I_N : Right. I understand . 
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR . LIEBERMAN : And I have a hard copy of our 
exhibits , it ' s a courtesy copy for you , would--wou l d you like 
me to give you that now or would you like me to bring i t to--
THE COURT : Why don ' t you bring it at trial --
MR . LIEBERMAN : Okay . 
THE COURT : - -because I ' m not going to take a l ook 
at i t unti l the day of trial. 
MR. LIEBERMAN : I understand . 
THE COURT : And I don ' t want to look a t i t know i ng 
that the re ' s going to be some objections made, so you know, 
we ' ll handle those at t he day of trial , I guess , or as the 
exhi b i ts are brought forward , unless you want to handle them 
separ ately . 
What I'd like is if there are exhib i ts that you c an 
stipulate t o , to let me know in advance and that way , we know 
that those exhibits are stipulated to, it ' ll make it easier 
for the clerks if they knew there were certain exh i bits that 










































MR. LIEBERMAN : And I--and I ' m also fine with--with 
addressing all those issues at trial and, you know, so that 
Mr . McIntyre doesn't have to file a written objection and then 
I respond to that . You krio~ , I'll have t he offer, what I 
offer and he can make his objection at that time . 
MR . McINTYRE : That would be fine with me, your 
Honor. I don ' t - -
MR . LIEBERMAN : Okay . 
MR . Mc I NTYRE : --I 'm not objecting to the 
authenticity of the documents, Mr . Lieberman~ but to whether 
o r not they should be admitted because they ' re e ither so 
remote t hat they 're no longer relevant or--well , I --there is 
one computation that he has in there that's not--
THE COURT: Right . 
MR . McINTYRE : --in my view , a p r oper one 
(inaudible) . 
THE COURT : Okay. But are there any--are there 
exhibits that you 're goin g to be able to stipulate to , 
Counsel? 
MR . LIEBERMAN : I mean, I would--I would--
MR . McINTYRE : I would think we can , clearly--
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR. McINTYRE : - -as far as the 2009--
MR. LIEBERtl'l.AN : I don't know that I have any 
































all e i ther- - either admissible evidence or proper s ummaries a nd 
I see he's got a lot of child suppor t work sheets in there , 
I'm okay with t hat . 
THE COURT : Okay . Well, if _ you can identify those , 
you know , prior to trial and say, we stipu late t o these , these 
are the ones we have objection - -tha t we b e lieve we have 
objections to , then that way , 1--for me , t he Court , I ' ll know 
in advance which exhibits are going to be- - are going to have 
i ssues that we need t o discuss . 
MR . Mc I NTYRE : I - - I did no~ice that we have--we both 
submi t t e d our e xhibits sequentially numerically and some--
MR . LIEBERM_AN : I got l e t te rs . 
MR . McINTYRE: You used letters on your --okay . 
MR. LIEBERM}\N : Yeah . 
!V.IR . McINTYRE : Never mind . 
MR . LIEBERMAN : One used "Ru -- "Rn and then the 
number and exc l us~ve ly letters . 
MR . McINTYRE : Okay . 
THE COURT : Okay . 
MR. LIEBERMAN: Wi l l that be okay? 
THE COURT : Yes . That would be pe r fect . But if you 
can identify those in advance and that way , the Court - -
MR . McINTYRE : We wil l . 
THE COURT : - -can prepare in advance for what those 
objections may be . Al l right? 
9 
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MR . LIEBERJvLi'.\N: We ' l l do that, your Honor . 
THE COURT : Al l r i ght . Well, gentl emen , thank you 
for being here today and I appreciate your patience in wa iting 
for the other group, too . 
MR . LIEBER.V.LAN : No problem . 
THE COURT : And we 'll see you on October 2~ . 
MR . LIEBERM..tlli : Al l right . 
MR . McINTYRE : Thank you , your Honor . 
THE COURT : Al l r i gh t. Thank you. 
(Whereupon , this hearing was conclu ded . ) 
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